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Peter Williamson 
Introduction: The Force for Reform 
Discussion of reform in the Scottish Health Service (SHS) a decade ago 
would have presented a sharp contrast with the beginning of the 1990s. From 
1979 to 1985 the Service in Scotland had struggled to introduce a relatively 
minor organisational reform of replacing districts, the second management 
tier of Area Health Boards, with units of management. (ll The difficulties were 
in large measure a general lack of enthusiasm for reform of any sort and, 
consequently, any coherent strategy. Indeed, the position was very candidly 
exposed by the then Scottish Health Minister, Russell Fairgrieve, when he 
stated: 'Supposing Scotland was totally separate. You might well say 'Would 
you have gone ahead with a reorganisation'? The answer probably on balance 
might have been no. But with England having to do it we felt on balance we 
should do it. '(2) 
This relatively relaxed view was soon to be expunged as a result of the 
major reforms resulting from the Management Inquiry Team (Griffiths) 
Report which focussed on England, but on which Scotland was not going to 
take an independent line. The reforms that Griffiths initiated marked the most 
significant reorganisation of the NHS since its inception in 1948. However, 
throughout the 1980s there have been on-going reforms such as compulsory 
competitive tendering, 'efficiency savings' and performance review, all 
designed to make the Service give better 'value for money'. The 1980s have not 
just been a period of major change for the SHS, but one of increasing 
convergence with England. At the end of the 1980s the government 
announced even more far-reaching reforms with the introduction of an 
'internal market'. Perhaps significantly in terms of our present concern these 
reforms were introduced by the NHS and Community Care Act which covered 
both Scotland and England- a first for the NHS. Even the name of the SHS has 
been changed to "The NHS in Scotland". The management changes 
inaugurated as a result of Griffiths and the evidence of their impact will be 
reviewed below. A later section considers the general thrust of the internal 
market reforms, looks at associated management changes, and considers the 
implications of this for the Service in Scotland. Most of the changes discussed 
parallel events in England, and only difference will be highlighted. An 
argument that will be developed later on is that although the plans for reform 
have been virtually identical, there have been variations in actual practice 
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between Scotland and England. It should be mentioned, however, that 
organisationally Scotland does differ somewhat from England in terms of 
formal structure: Scotland has areas, England districts; Scotland has no 
regional tier; in Scotland there is no equivalent to England's Family Health 
Service Authorities, with Health Boards managing primary care; and certain 
national forums and advisory bodies are different in form. 
The Griffiths Report: The Force for Change 
The Management Inquiry Team was set up in February 1983 by the 
English Secretary of State for Health, Norman Fowler, to examine whether 
the resources put into the Service 'are managed efficiently and give the nation 
value for money. '(3) The report, which came out in November of the same 
year, echoed the government's views that the NHS was inefficiently and 
ineffectively managed when compared to the private business sector. Many 
doubted the validity of such a comparison, which was not based on any 
measures of performance, just observation of practice, but the Report 
contended that management in the NHS was in a poor state on almost ever); 
possible count. 'Above all', there was extreme difficulty in achieving change.< l 
The answer to these various problems was management leadership to be 
brought about by the introduction of general managers who were to have 
overall responsibility for services and could give the Service direction. ('i) In 
consequence, the consensus management approach which had given equal 
voices to medical officers, nursing officers, finance officers and administrators 
on management teams responsible for running the Service at various levels, 
and which to many reflected the pluralistic nature of the NHS, was to be 
removed. 
The appointment of general managers was not, however, the only club in 
Griffiths' golfbag. For one thing, general management as a process had to be 
instilled at all levels within the organisation. In effect, Griffiths' view was that 
management was too firmly based on the function or profession, and this 
meant fragmentation and division. On top of this was the implicit argument 
that management in the NHS needed not only to be changed, but also 
strengthened. <6l Administration was to give way to management, and there 
was to be an extensive devolution of management responsibility to invigorate 
lower levels of the organisation. More broadly Griffiths was looking to bring 
about a change in the culture of the organisation so that it was geared up to 
serve its 'customers' rather than the interests of the providers of the service. 
Roy Griffiths subsequently admitted that this was at least a ten-year project. 
While Griffiths is most closely associated with the introduction of general 
managers and general management, there were two other important strands to 
the recommendations. One was an attempt to try to separate the management 
of the NHS from politics by creating an NHS Management Board under a 
general manager to manage the English Service from within the DHSS. <7l The 
NHS was intended to move in the direction of nationalised industries. 
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Secondly, hospital doctors who largely dictate the use of resources were to 
become involved formally in the management of resources at ward level 
through the introduction of management budgets. <8) 
The Introduction of General Management in Scotland 
In June 1984 Scottish Secretary George Younger issued a consultation 
paper which stated that 'the general principles underlying this (Griffiths) 
analysis apply to the Service in Scotland'. So general managers were to be 
introduced into the SHS who would take on 'personal responsibility for the 
efficiency, economy and general quality of service delivered at their particular 
level. '(9) There were only two differences of any note from what had been 
proposed for England. In Scotland the introduction of general management 
was to be phased in, with changes in units occurring some year after the 
appointment of Board General Managers. (JO) (The English circular, which also 
came out in June 1984, had a simple date for completion of everything- the 
end of 1985). The consultation paper, in effect, created a period to review 
arrangements for units. The other proposal for which there was no similar 
provision in England, was that Board General Managers were to be 
responsible to the Accounting Officer of the SHHD for Board finances, while 
generally being responsible to Boards for their management. (II) 
The consultation process produced a very mixed, and not wholly 
favourable, reaction. Examination of the relevant materiaJs(IZ) indicated that 
in at least half of the Boards, members and chief officers were generally happy 
with the status quo and saw no grounds for reform. The proposals were 
viewed, not entirely wrongly, as a threat to both the position of the Board and 
officers in the Area Executive Group. Even those Boards in which there was 
some support for the concept of general management - usually those facing 
difficulties with consensus management - found the consultation paper short 
on details. There was also widespread concern about 'divided loyalties' 
resulting from the proposal that the Board General Manager was to have an 
additional responsibility to the Accounting Officer of the SHHD for the 
Board's finances. (!3) 
Further down the organisation, the consultation process revealed serious 
misgivings about, and often outright opposition to, the proposals. Clearly 
many professionals and professional bodies were worried about losing 
managerial independence if they were to become managerially accountable to 
a lay manager. Perhaps most importantly what emerged from the consultation 
process was the absence of an agenda for reform of any sort within Boards. The 
move to reform the Service was certainly not going to begin as a grass roots' 
movement. 
The consultation process had no real impact upon the resulting 
circular<14l, which simply amplified what had already been set out in the 
consultation paper. So by the end of 1985 all Board General Managers had 
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been appointed. There was no major influx of new blood into the Service as at 
one time had seemed likely. In the case of the twelve mainland Boards, six of 
the Board General Managers had previously been a member of the Area 
Executive Group of their Board. Two others had come from other Boards and 
one from the English Service at Regional level, while the rest were outsiders to 
the Service. Only one came directly from the private sector. 
The appointment of Board General Managers was only the first phase, 
and one of the first tasks that fell to the new managers was to review their unit 
management arrangements. In August 1985 the SHHD commissioned 
Coopers & Lybrand Associates to examine the options for introducing general 
management into units in Scotland. This study was based upon an examination 
of arrangements in four Boards, and also upon the response to the SHHD 
consultative letter of July 1985 asking interested parties for their views. The 
report was published in April1986. It revealed some important shortcomings 
in the way units were organised and managed, despite the fact that they had 
been reformed just three years earlier. In particular, it was noted that units 
were a weak tier of management, normally lacking effective powers and with 
inadequate management structures and support for effective decision making. 
Such problems were often compounded by the existence of a large number of 
small units within Boards. (IS) 
To strengthen management at unit level the report endorsed the 
appointment of Unit General Managers. (l6) However, it was recognised that 
Unit General Managers were not the complete answer to the problem. The 
function of units had to be clarified on a Scottish basis: 'The function of Area 
should focus on strategic matters; the function of units should focus upon 
operational management', although it was acknowledged that no sharp 
distinction was possible. <17) In addition, the report laid down certain structural 
principles that units should meet to ensure that they were large enough to be 
effective management entities and redeploy resources, clearly defined in terms 
of responsibilities and have a clear sense of identity. (l8) In respect of their 
internal arrangements Boards were to be given a free hand, except that, to 
develop a corporate identity and to reflect the multi-disciplinary nature of the 
Service, a version of existing management teams were to be retained. (l 9) 
After consultation on the Coopers & Lybrand Report in the form of a 
draft circular, the circular re~arding general management at the unit level was 
introduced in August 1986. (Z ) This largely accepted and repeated the Coopers 
& Lybrand Report. However, one of the consequences of appointing Unit 
General Managers was to end the line management responsibilities of the 
Chief Area Nursing Officer, the Treasurer and Chief Administrative Medical 
Officer over unit staff who were now to be responsible managerially to the 
Unit General Manager. The circular, however, stated that all three posts be 
retained at area/headquarters level. These three officers were regarded as 
essential for providing a 'corporate approach' to management. Further, the 
Board members would require advice and information regarding these three 
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key functions, and all three retained certain statutory responsibilities. 
Somewhat significantly, they were to retain the right of access to the Board 
regarding professional matters, and in various guises were to remain 
professionally responsible for staff within their function. Thus two lines of 
accountability were created within Boards: managerially through general 
managers; and professionally through professional officers, with the Board 
acting as the final guardian of professional accountability. <21 ) These provisions, 
which were not adopted in England, were seen by many general managers to 
be the result of a rearguard action by the professions within the SHHD to 
defend their positions in the new era of management, and flew against the 
spirit of general management. 
In the first quarter of 1987 Unit General Managers took up their posts, 
and changes were made to management arrangements. This was an unsettled 
period for the SHS with the responsibilities of many management posts being 
shifted about or redefined, and a number of people having to apply, not always 
successfully, for their 'old jobs'. As with Board General Managers, there was 
no influx of outsiders into Unit General Manager posts. Of the Unit General 
Managers appointed around three-quarters came from within the SHS, 
although many found themselves moving within and between Boards. Only 
10% were outsiders to the NHS. <22) The new cadre of general managers was 
created largely by appointing 'the best' of those who were already within the 
Service. Moreover, most came from administrative backgrounds; the 
professions were very under-represented. 
The introduction of general management in Scotland had been conducted 
in a very mechanistic manner with little flair and imagination, and sometimes 
not much guidance either. The SHHD was seen by many to be not very 
enthusiastic towards the reforms that it was overseeing. Thus those general 
managers taking up the new posts in 1985 and 1987 found themselves squeezed 
between a lack of direction and strategy from above and considerable 
suspicion from staff below. (Indeed, many saw general managers as the agents 
of a hostile government put in place to oversee cutbacks.) In these 
circumstances the first year or so of unit general management was a 
particularly difficult period all round, with often faltering progress. 
Nonetheless, general management did finally find its feet and began to bring 
about the changes it was introduced to achieve. 
The Impact of General Management in Scotland 
Looking back to time before general management it is hard not to 
conclude that the reforms have had a major impact, at least upon the 
management of the Service. What impact it has had on the services themselves 
is far more difficult to determine. <23) 
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Escaping the Past 
The results of general management in the early years were strongly 
influenced by the agenda adopted by general managers. At both Board and 
unit levels, general managers were concerned to remove what had been 
viewed as the main weaknesses of the old, consensus arrangements. These 
were slow and compromise or 'lowest common denominator' decision-
making, a lack of follow-through to see that decisions were put into effect, 
weak financial management and an absence of a sense of direction represented 
in objectives and plans. Many of these problems have been cast aside by 
general management. Decision-making, led by general managers, is now 
sharper, more dynamic and quicker. Boards and units are now able to dispatch 
much more business, and can be seen to be operating on a much wider front of 
issues than previously. There is also a clearer allocation of responsibility, 
improving financial management and greater use of formal objectives and 
plans. 
It is important to stress that sharper decision-making has seldom had to be 
achieved through general managers adopting the role of an arbitrator or 'boss 
figure', pushing through decisions against opposition. Instead, general 
managers have supplied leadership, a sense of direction, clear allocation of 
responsibilities and the creation of momentum. A particularly significant 
change is that decision-making has become much less formalised, with the 
general management working through individuals or groups of relevant staff 
on a project basis. There is much less work done in committees and formal 
teams. In many instances this leaves general managers free to delegate 
responsibility and simply monitor results. General managers - especially 
Board General Managers - are seldom involved in all aspects of decision 
making, a criticism made of the old consensus teams. <24>. 
The reforms were intended to do more than add a bit of zip to decision 
making and make the shift from reactive administration to proactive 
management. <25> The establishment of general management at unit level, after 
some initial hesitancy, has seen a noticeable strengthening of management 
closer to point of service delivery, aided by the delegation of budgets to units 
and the establishment of operational planning. The result of this is that service 
developments can be brought about more quickly and that there has been a 
much greater focus on the non-clinical aspects of quality of service. However, 
as we shall see presently, this strengthening of management in units has tended 
to rest at the top; there remain cases of weakness at middle and clinical 
management levels. 
One problem that many expected would arise was the integration of 
professional officers into a general management system. General management 
clearly represented a demotion in the position of professional officers. At area 
level, the evidence is that professional officers have for the most part been 
effectively integrated into the new management arrangements, although some 
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'early retirements' helped to pave the way for this. A surprising number of 
Chief Administrative Medical Officers, Chief Area Nursing Officers, and 
Treasurers, while recognising that formally their status has declined, have 
welcomed the changes. This view reflects that many believe their actual 
influence on events has increased. Freed from line-management 
responsibilities, and often given responsibilities beyond their formal position, 
they have been able to play a greater role in managing the Service. (26) In other 
words, professional officers, most obviously finance officers(27l, have been 
able to take on a quasi-general management role. However, while their 
personal influence on major issues has increased, that of their profession's 
voice has declined. 
The position has been somewhat different at unit level. There, 
professional officers, who usually maintain line-management responsibility, 
have tended to find it less easy to slip into a quasi-general management role. 
Indeed, many Unit General Managers feel frustrated that they do not receive 
the kind of back-up from other unit officers that can allow them to concentrate 
on the key issues. 
The integration of professional officers has been achieved despite the 
potential difficulties of dividing professional and managerial accountability. 
The division is, however, in reality a nebulous one; most of the time it is 
impossible to distinguish between the managerial and professional elements of 
an officer's work. In practice, largely informal and cooperative relations 
between general managers and professional officers at both Board and unit 
level have meant that possible conflicts have seldom arisen. This must in 
considerable measure be put down to a largely shared (or flexible) view about 
the Service and where it is going among officers and managers. 
Looking to the Future 
The above can be seen to indicate that general management has been 
successful in that it has worked, despite what the army of doubters argued in 
the mid 1980s. There are now very few voices who would argue the case for a 
return to the old consensus management. It needs to be stressed that the 
acceptance of general management is not universal, and many staff still have 
doubts about how it operates in practice, and even more are unhappy about a 
number of government-led developments which general managers had to 
implement. 
Moreover, the success is far from absolute. In part, it should be 
remembered that general management was seen as a long-term 
transformation, and the process of development continues. More importantly, 
there has been a failure to progress effectively in some directions indicated by 
its original sponsors. In addition, there have been some negative side-effects. 
General management has proved very successful at displacing the old 
management arrangements, and has made a new version work; but it has yet to 
196 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1992 
prove conclusively that it can move beyond simply improving operational 
management processes to create wider change. 
One shortcoming of general mangement has been the failure to develop a 
longer strategic vision of where services should be going within their area. The 
NHS for decades has faced the big planning issues of how to balance services 
equitably among different care groups, for example, to make proper provision 
for the frail elderly and mentally handicapped, and meet the needs for health 
promotion and prevention. General managers have failed to get to grips with 
these, in large measure, it must be said, because political debate on the NHS 
has become fixated with acute and child health services. Nonetheless, more 
was expected of general mangement to see through long-term strategic policy 
changes. A related area where general management has not developed as 
many would have hoped is its strategic capacity. According to circular 
1986(Gen)20 the function of area level was to be 'strategic management'. (28) In 
practice, area has significantly retained a "headquarters supervising, 
overseeing' function, and not fully shifted to an 'area guiding, planning' role. 
There are a number of reasons for this: the increased place of monitoring and 
control, and general assessment of performance; the large number of 
initiatives from the central department which squeezes Boards' agendas and 
deflects attention from the long term strategic issues; a general absence of an 
overall conceptualisation of what a strategic role at area w"ould look like; and 
difficulties in organising strategic planning effectively. 
If general management has not made the expected mark strategically, it is 
also generally recognised that there have been limits to the extent to which 
general management has extended down the organisation. The appointment 
of Board General Managers and Unit General Managers represented the first 
stages, but a wider general management process and approach by individual 
managers was supposed to develop further down the organisation. While the 
process of extending general management has never come to a complete halt, 
it is clear that in many Boards general management did get stuck at or around 
the level of the Unit Management Team. Thus middle management in units 
continued to operate under the old-style, functional management. The result 
of this appears to be that there is insufficjent leadership at middle and 'front-
line' levels, and this has limited the scope for achieving change on the ground. 
Only recently have general managers begun to get to grips with developing 
structures of 'sub-unit general management'. 
The limited extension of general management downwards has been 
mirrored by the restricted involvement of doctors in management. This was 
one of the central planks of the Griffiths Report, and was echoed by the 
governmeqt. (29) Management budgeting, the original means for drawing 
hospital doctors into management, was abandoned after the pilot sites in both 
England and Scot1and had failed to work and had generated adverse reactions 
among clinical staff. While management bud6eting was replaced by the more 
flexible initiative of resource management o), there was little immediate 
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progress in Scotland. Involving doctors in management is a delicate matter 
confronting matters of professional autonomy, and without any real impetus 
and support from the central department, Unit General Managers had to 
adopt a softly, softly approach to bring doctors into management, with the 
emphasis upon building support before moving to make changes. Given that it 
was a high-risk exercise, and seemed to carry little priority at the centre, it was 
hardly surprising that Unit General Managers did not rush into creating 
structures to draw doctors formally into the management of resources.<31 l 
General management may not have moved forward on all fronts, but 
there has not been a lack of activity- rather the opposite is the case. Boards 
and units have been able to initiate a major series of changes. There remains 
concern, however, that, while the flow of developments and initiatives has 
increased, there is inadequate time to bed them in properly and to provide the 
necessary follow-through to ensure that they produce the intended results. 
General management may have increased the policy-making capacity of 
Boards, but as the discussion on the extension of general management down 
the organisation implies, there may not have been a commensurate increase in 
the capacity to implement and review the impact of policies. Similarly, there is 
concern that what exists now is not quick decision-making, but rushed decision 
making with inadequate time for proper analysis of issues. Most worryingly, 
there has emerged a trend, under the continual pressure to bring about 
change, of managers increasingly making short-term, high profile innovations 
and initiatives which give the appearance, but not always the substance, of 
change. In the new management culture and the increasingly high political 
profile of the Service, public relations in a wide sense has become increasingly 
important. <32) 
Without doubt the most serious impediment to general management has 
come from the SHHD's failure early on to embrace the spirit of Griffiths that 
general management should be accompanied by greater devolution of 
management responsibilities. The NHS has always tended to be bureaucratic, 
but the arrival of general management saw the removal of many rather petty 
rules and regulations. The SHHD did, however, find it difficult to let go of the 
reins, and continued to make demands for considerable amounts of 
information for monitoring purposes and to intervene widely. This has been 
compounded by an obvious failure to give a clear strategic lead and to set out 
priorities. Indeed, as one Unit General Manager remarked about the SHHD, 
'everything is a priority'. The result is that Board and unit agendas tended to 
become over-burdened and lack coherence, while the flexibility enjoyed by 
local management is not commensurate with the job that general managers 
were supposed to carry out. The balance between the centre's roles of 
providing broad strategic policy guidance and that of monitoring and control, 
was felt by many general managers and others to be seriously skewed. <33) Part 
of the problem was seen to lie in the small number of senior civil servants in the 
SHHD, combined with high turnover, which meant it was not equipped to act 
as the executive board for the NHS in Scotland. <34) General management was 
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most lacking from the Service right at the very centre. 
Reform Again: The Internal Market 
Just as the pattern of general management in Scotland was taking shape, 
including its strengths and shortcomings, and the needs for future 
development were emerging with some clarity, the NHS embarked on even 
more far-reaching reforms. In January 1989, following a lengthy review ofthe 
NHS led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, a White Paper Working for 
Patients was issued<35l The main plank of the reform was to split the NHS into 
two distinct parts: purchasers of services and providers of services, thereby 
creating an 'internal market' in care. The purchasers were to consist of Health 
Boards and those larger GP practices which opted to become fundholders who 
were to purchase care on behalf of those people on their practice lists. The 
providers were to be made up of: Health Board units - the so-called directly 
managed units; NHS self-governing trusts - separate authorities under the 
direct control of the SHHD; and private and voluntary providers. When the 
White Paper was published there was considerable comment in the SHS that 
the reforms were not relevant to Scotland, but were reforms for the Health 
Service in London. However, Scotland has undergone virtually the same 
package of changes. 
The idea of the internal market is that purchasers of care will be able to 
shop around to purchase the best in terms of price and quality. Logically a 
hospital could go out of business. (J6) Therefore, there is a direct pressure on 
those hospitals and services that are comparatively costly or of low quality to 
improve 'performance'. To work, however, the market will require that there 
is a choice of different suppliers of services, and that there is or can be found 
excess capacity to allow the provision of care to be moved about to get the 'best 
buy'. 
There has been much speculation as to how the 'internal market' will 
operate. What has become clear is that nobody fully knows because it depends 
greatly upon how the various actors decide to behave. For example, will 
Health Boards be inclined to buy cheaper health care at lower levels of quality 
to reduce waiting lists, or will they seek to maintain standards? Will hospitals 
act in consort or competitively? Are people willing to travel further for better 
care? In any case, the market is likely to operate differently in say Inverness or 
Dumfries than in Glasgow or Edinburgh. What is evident is that the market is 
to be introduced gradually. The talk from the central department for a year 
before the reforms arrived was of 'soft landings' and 'no bumpy rides'. Most 
people accept that it will take at least three years before the market is properly 
operational. 
Whatever the ultimate impact of the internal market, the White Paper will 
lead to important changes in the management of the Service. For one thing 
there will now exist a much sharper division between the role of Area Boards 
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and units, even although those units which are not trusts will still be managed 
by Boards. Greater delegation to units has occurred and the headquarters of 
Boards are being reduced considerably in terms of staff numbers. Greater 
autonomy for units in line with trusts are the way forward. (J?) In the longer run, 
the continued viability of Area Boards is open to doubt. It is increasingly 
recognised that Areas are probably too small entities geographically to 
perform a strategic role. Certainly, there could be a logical reason for 
amalgamating a number of them, although much depends on whether the view 
prevails that purchasing should be informed by local needs or the use of 
organisational muscle to put pressure on providers. The case for 
amalgamation would be increased greatly by the creation of a large number of 
trusts. 
Given that the purchaser/provider split has led to delegation to units, and 
will require units to operate business plans and deliver on their contracts with 
purchasers, the reforms have given considerable impetus to strengthening 
middle management within units and drawing doctors into management. What 
a hospital provides in terms of services is going to be much more clearly 
specified, and costed, and the management structures based on particular 
services such as maternity or general surgery, are having to be developed so 
that contracts can be agreed and delivered. Part of this process has involved 
decidin~ to introduce resource management throughout Scotland by the end of 
1992Y8 This will, among other things, provide the information systems that 
will allow for costing of services and bring clinicians more directly into 
management. 
Two other major management changes have been inaugurated by 
Working for Patients. One is the establishment of a Management Executive 
for the NHS in Scotland; the other is the reconstituting of the membership of 
Health Boards. 
Working for Patients announced that 'it is desirable that the management 
of the Health Service should be strengthened and the Government has decided 
to appoint a Chief Executive for the NHS in Scotland'. (39) Similar proposals 
were put forward for England. There was no doubt that a 'general manager' at 
the central department was something that was widely welcomed by general 
managers. In October 1990, Don Cruickshank, a Scot who had been chairman 
of Wandsworth health authority and managing director of Richard Branson's 
Virgin Group, was appointed. The appointment generated some fears of a 
'business take-over' among many Service staff. The role of the chief executive 
has become defined as: securing the implementation of policies; strengthening 
management within the SHHD; providing central leadership for the reforms; 
and the formulation of a sustainable strategy and development plan for the 
Service. (40) Policy making was to remain, however, firmly under the control of 
ministers. In addition to the chief executive himself, a Management Executive 
was established consisting of six directors and the Chief Medical and Nursing 
Officers. The six directors were: strategic management; health services 
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operations; finance; manpower; administration; and a director to oversee the 
reforms. In addition, a number of divisons of the Common Services Agency 
was brought within the Management Executive.(4J) The chief executive is 
personally accountable to ministers, and acts like any other civil servant on 
behalf of ministers. 
It is too early yet to assess the impact of the Management Executive. All 
that one can say at the moment is that much of its work has been caught up with 
the NHS reforms. There has, however, been some concern expressed within 
Health Boards that the kind of leadership being sought has not been provided 
and that it has become too closely connected with monitoring. 
The second change announced in Working for Patients was a change to 
the membership of Health Boards. This was to make Boards smaller in 
numbers, and to change the sources of recruitment to 'reflect the changing 
requirements'. (42) Part of the changed role was to provide greater strategic 
leadership on long-term issues. Boards are to have no more than 12 members, 
less than the norm of 13-19 members prior to the changes. There will be two 
categories of members, executive and non-executive, with the latter always 
being in a majority. The only guaranteed executive member is to be the Board 
General Manager, although it is expected that in most Boards the Treasurer 
and the Medical Officer/Director of Public Health will be members. 
The role of the Board is to change significantly, becoming much more 
explicitly a managerial body and largely losing any pretensions- appointments 
to Boards were increasingly political- to being one that is representative of the 
local community. Non-executive members in effect are to be chosen in most 
cases because of their business management experience. Collectively the 
Board is to set key objectives and policies, and determine management 
structures. In addition, non-executive members are to monitor and oversee 
the implementation of policies. Individually, the chairman is to provide 
leadership, represent the Board to the outside world and direct the work of 
non-executive members. (43) 
While Boards will principally act as purchasers of services by negotiating 
contracts with providers based upon an assessment of the health needs of their 
population, they will also retain a responsibility for managing their own units 
which are not trusts. However, it is clear that, if not immediately, then 
increasingly, there is a requirement to take a 'hands-off approach which both 
allows units to become trusts, and allows Boards to purchase from units or 
trusts in other Board areas. (44} 
These developments stemming from Working for Patients probably will 
contribute to a strengthening of general management within Scotland, 
although how far and with what side-effects remain to be discovered. In many 
cases they are a logical development from the earlier reforms. Central 
direction through the Management Executive was certainly much needed by 
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general managers. Much will depend upon how far government and the 
department can go along with their own rhetoric of 'local management' and 
how far the pressure to intervene and control will remain. There is little doubt 
that the reforms have further strengthened the hand of managers and 
diminished the formal position of professional officers. Such developments 
generate considerable unease more broadly within the professions who are 
concerned that the professional dimension is getting squeezed out of decision-
making at all levels. The NHS is becoming much more like a business run by a 
professional corps of managers; and much less like a public service managed by 
professionals. The doctors do, however, retain considerable autonomy from 
management, although many felt the net is closing in on them. The internal 
market will weaken their position, but not to such an extent that they will cease 
to be a key partner in decision-making. 
Reforming the NHS: An Overview 
The 1980s were not a period of paper reforms for the NHS in Scotland. 
Unlike previous reforms in the NHS, which tended to introduce a new 
structure and then leave people to get on with it, the present reforms have been 
designed to be ongoing and sustained. This will continue under the NHS and 
Community Care Act and the internal market. To date there has been little 
public support for these new reforms, and many in the Service are suspicious of 
the direction being taken and the rhetoric espoused. The most controversial 
part of the reforms, has been the possibility of units becoming self-governing. 
By August 1991, six out of 53 units in Scotland had or were about to make 
applications to become self-giverning, although some seemed to be doing so 
because their position was in jeopardy (echoes of what happened with 
schools). <45l In most cases hospital staff were largely opposed to the change of 
status. However, if there is no change in government then the spread of trusts 
is likely to grow rapidly as their financial advantages will make it a club few can 
afford not to join. The freedom that trusts might enjoy- assuming the SHHD 
takes a hands-off approach- will allow for significant changes to be introduced 
in Scotland's hospitals. The extension of a business management approach will 
move forward markedly and quickly. However, it should be emphasised that 
overall these are long-term reforms, requiring the development of new 
financial and support systems. Keeping the momentum going will not be easy. 
The development of the new changes will also see in formal terms a 
growing convergence of the SHS with its English counterpart. Over the 1980s 
the policy and managerial independence of the Service in Scotland has 
diminished. With one or two relatively minor exceptions it is now hard to 
discern a distinctive Scottish health policy. Scotland effectively follows what is 
planned for England, not just in general terms but in much of the detail. The 
centrally directed diminution of Scottish independence, however, has not so 
far been fully reflected on the ground. The evidence from comparative work in 
Scotland and England<46l indicates that the impact of general management in 
Scotland has been more muted, noticeably less 'macho', than in England. 
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There has also been less overt conflict between managers and professionals, 
and a more consensual approach in evidence. With exceptions there is a 
difference in management style which is noticeable, and a more traditional 
view of the Service retained in Scotland. There is also some evidence that 
Scottish managers have a broader, less finance-led agenda. In sum, these 
reforms have clearly not been driven so hard or fast through Scotland, and 
probably have not been able to travel so readily in the Scottish 
environment. <47) There is some evidence that the latest reforms are not 
proceeding as quickly as south of the border. <48l The more lenient atmosphere 
in Scotland in part is no doubt due to the funding levels enjoyed in Scotland, 
23% per capita above the English average. (This crude figure should not be 
taken to indicate that Scotland is better-off by a quarter). Likewise, the point 
that Scottish units are larger on average has probably created some barriers in 
terms of size for the achievement of change. 
At the end of the day, however, one is drawn to evidence that there is a 
distinctive Scottish 'culture' that has taken out some of the fizz of the reforms, 
and even ensured that less fizz was put in in the first place. Of course, culture 
can be a nebulous, catch-all concept. Scotland does, however, vote differently 
from England, and Scotland as a country has not embraced many of the 
Conservative Government's initiatives as warmly as south of the border. It is 
hardly surprising if this does not impinge upon the way public services are 
managed. This is a point highlighted by Laurence Peterken, Greater 
Glasgow's General Manager, when he stated that: 'One always gets painted 
with a black brush if you're changing anything in the NHS in Glasgow and 
perhaps Scotland generally, where there tends to be a fairly left of centre trade 
union orientated attitude to life. •<49l The Service in Scotland has been less 
welcoming of the business ethic. Formally and officially Scotland is more or 
less identical to England. In this sense, the reforms have followed English 
plans. Informally and unofficially Scotland has not moved so quickly along the 
road. There has been a Scottish interpretation. (SO) Whether this unofficial 
'devolution' will last is not certain. 
Peter Williamson, Director of Planning and Development, Priority Services 
Unit, Grampian Health Board. 
August 1991 
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